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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IMPACT OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT ON PRIVATELY ENDOWED
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d
844, cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 1383 (1958)
Petitioners, two Negro orphans, sought admission to Girard College, a Philadelphia school for fatherless, boys founded in 1831 by
testamentary trust. Admission was denied them by the trustees, the
Board of City Trusts, and the state courts. Subsequently the United
States Supreme Court held that the action of the Board, a state agency,
was discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 2
The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, possessing plenary power over
trusts administered by the Board, 3 construed the Court's opinion to
mean only that the Board was constitutionally incompetent to carry
out the testator's intention, and decreed, without further hearings,
the substitution of private trustees for the Board of City Trusts. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, HELD, the Orphans'
Court acted within its powers in carrying out the purposes of a private
charitable trust, and its action did not impinge on the civil rights
of Negro children. Decrees affirmed. Certiorari denied by the United
4
States Supreme Court.
The enforceability of the charitable trust in this country was first
predicated on a state's express retention of the English Statute of
Charitable Uses as state common law. 5 Later it was upheld merely
on the basis of the English common law prior to this statute. 6 Orthodox theory labels a trust charitable if it combines a worthy purpose with a sufficiently broad classification of beneficiaries.7 The
great weight of authority holds that restrictions on property conveyed
'In Sooham v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 9 (1859), the court interpreted the testamentary limitation to orphans to mean fatherless rather than parentless children.
2Pennsylvania v. Board of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
3Wilson v. Board of City Trusts, 324 Pa. 545, 548, 188 At. 588, 590 (1936).
See also 3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §2242 (1930).
478 Sup. Ct. 1383 (1958).
sTrustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
1 (1819).
Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
'See 4 ScoTr, TRusTs §368 (2d ed. 1956).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 8
CASE COMMENTS
in trust to charitable corporations are valid, just as they would be if
the property were given to individual trustees for charitable purposes.8 Generally a municipality is competent to administer a charitable trust when so empowered by the legislature. 9 If the trust is
otherwise valid, it will not fail merely because the testator named
as trustee a municipal corporation that is incompetent to administer
the trust.10 By use of the equitable doctrine of cy pres the court will
appoint a new trustee, and the trust will not fail unless an essential
part of the testator's intent was that the municipality act as trustee."
In the instant case these traditional attitudes of the courts toward
charitable trusts are interfused with the legal and political vicissitudes
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Initially, the narrow issue was whether
the Board of City Trusts could constitutionally administer the trust.'2
This was tersely decided in the negative by the United States Supreme Court on the rationale of its epochal 1954 school segregation
decision, 3 which forbade "state action" in racial discrimination.14
The case was remanded, however, without explicit directions to admit the petitioners.15 This was interpreted by the state courts as leaving to their discretion, in applying the doctrine of cy pres, the responsibility for ascertaining the testator's paramount intent: exclusion of Negroes or trusteeship of the city. By electing to replace the
city as trustee, the Orphans' Court set the stage for the present attack
on the constitutionality of the discriminatory clause itself. This attack was considered by some to jeopardize the validity of all charitable
Bid. §348.1; see, e.g., Loechel v. Columbia Borough School Dist., 369 Pa. 132,
85 A.2d 81 (1952).

gGirard v. Philadelphia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 1, 14 (1868); Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 465 (1860); Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 189 (1844).
loSee Scorr, Tsusrs §96.5 (2d ed. 1956).
"'E.g., Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 22 At. 945 (1941); Keene v. Union

School Dist., 89 N.H. 477, 200 AtI. 514 (1938); see 1 Scowr, TRusTs §96.5 (2d ed.
1956).
2But see Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 558, 127 A.2d 287, 291 (1956). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the issue at that time as the constitutionality

of the trust provision excluding Negroes.
"3Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'4For an exposition of the United States Supreme Court's handling of the "state
action" label, see Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L.
R v. 213 (1956).

15Contrast this with Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950), in which there
was a specific mandate by the Court that "petitioner [a Negro] be admitted to
the University of Texas Law School."
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trusts that discriminate as to race, creed, or color.16 Their fears - or
hopes - were extinguished by the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
Had the Court granted certiorari, it would have had no direct
authority on the constitutional issue confronting it. Parker v. University of Delaware17 and Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Libraryls afford
precedents for a finding of state action in respect to discrimination by
governmental trustees. The Parker case concerned a private university that was taken over by the state and designated a state university; the Kerr case concerned a self-perpetuating library board, originally appointed and financed by a private donor but also dependent on
an annual stipend from the City of Baltimore. The cumulative effect
of such factors as public management, regulatory statutes and ordinances in respect to the trusts, reports to and audits by government
officers, and state and city financial contributions led the federal
courts to ascribe a "public character" to these trusts that placed them
within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. The instant case
is manifestly distinguishable, however, in that no public funds have
ever been granted to the Girard Trust and the exclusion of Negroes
here is based on the settlor's express stipulation, whereas in the prior
cases the discrimination stemmed solely from the discretionary action
of the trustees. 19 Indeed, there is authority indicating that the State
of Pennsylvania could not have removed the discriminatory restric20
tion by statute.
Had the Court chosen to extend the rationale of the Kerr and
Parker cases to reverse the instant case irrespective of the private
trustees, its holding would have indicated only that a "public character" had so affixed itself to this particular charitable trust by virtue
of its myriad state contacts as to render unconstitutional its discriminatory provision.21 The applicability of such a holding could
16See, e.g., Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 559, 127 A.2d 287, 292 (1956); Clark,
Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard,
66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Gordon, The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a
Municipal Trust, 304 ANNALs 53 (1956); Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private
Schools, 41 MINN. L. REv. 145, 266-76 (1957).

1731 Del. Ch. 381, 75 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1950).
18149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
19See Shanks, supra note 14, at 231.
20See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 92 (1890); Brown v. Hummel,
6 Pa. 86 (1847); cf. Canovaro v. Brothers, 326 Pa. 76, 93, 191 Atd. 140, 149 (1937).
?'See Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 1945).
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have been confined to the facts of the instant case, for, although the
state's role in all charitable trusts is necessarily considerable, 22 it is
doubtful that any privately endowed charities have been as long and
as intimately associated with governmental activities as has the Girard
23
Trust.
On the other hand, had the Court chosen to utilize the second
substantive contention urged by the petitioners to reverse the holding
of the instant case, the legal repercussions in the fields of wills and
trusts would have been cataclysmic, not to say catastrophic. 24 This
argument asserts that under the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer 5 no court
may enforce any discriminatory condition to a private gift or trust
because the court itself is a state agency. Such an extension of the
Shelley doctrine has been refused by each court to which it has been
presented.26 This is the second occasion on which the Supreme Court
27
has denied review in such a case.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguishes the Shelley case
as founded on .the express constitutional right to own and enjoy
property, whereas the petitioners in the instant case have never acquired any status of right since they do not qualify as beneficiaries
under the terms of the will. Although this seems a nebulous distinction, it is difficult to find logical limits to the underlying proposition that whenever private discrimination is "supported by the full
panoply of state power" 28 - that is, court enforcement - state action
results. Several possible delimitations of the Shelley doctrine have
Clark, supra note 16, at 1003-09.
23For an enumeration of these associations, see the dissent of Musmanno, J., in
the instant case.
24See Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 570, 127 A.2d 287, 318 (1956) (concurring
opinion).
25334 U.S. 1 (1948). In this case the Court held that a racially restricted real
estate covenant could not be enforced by state courts because it would amount to
a denial by the state of the equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953); Note, 96 U. PA. L. Ray. 402 (1948). But cf. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 983 (1956).
26See Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 239 U.S.
947 (1955); United Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954).
But cf. Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867
(1953); Wilcox v. Horan, 178 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1949).
27Gordon v. Gordon, supra note 26, was the first.
28Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
22See
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been suggested, 29 such as confining it to (1) realty cases involving restrictive covenants, (2) contract cases in which there are willing
buyers and sellers, and (3) cases of discrimination by affirmative
court action as opposed to discrimination resulting from the court's
failure or refusal to act.
An explicit affirmance by the United States Supreme Court of
this discrimination returned to private form was unlikely in that it
inevitably would have been interpreted in many quarters as a retreat from the public policy enunciated by the Court in a long series
of cases30 commencing with Brown v. Board of Education.31
The significance of the instant case lies not in the wisdom or folly
of the Pennsylvania courts, despite the questionable evaluation of
Stephen Girard's primary intent 3 2 and the deleterious effect upon
Girard College of losing its city trusteeship. 33 The significance lies
in the monumental consequences that could have been precipitated
by the United States Supreme Court's handling of the constitutionality
of a discriminatory provision that can be correlated with the judicial
process. Had the Court invalidated the provision on the rationale
of the Shelley case, it would have implied that judicial action is "state
action" in every context, devastating not only the law of wills and of
trusts but, in the last analysis, subjecting all human activity to the
scrutiny of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the political pressures inherent in the civil rights question, the Court has again refused
to take this drastic step in the name of equal protection, thereby
indicating its reluctance to follow the logical and lingual implications of the redoubtable doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer to their ultimate legal and political dislocations.
WARREN

H.

COBB

29See Shanks, supra note 14, at 235-36.
30E.g., Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971

(1954); Muir
v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Tureaud v. Board of
Supervisors, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
31347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32See the dissent of Musmanno, J., in the instant case.
33See Miller, supra note 16.
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